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"Never again will they know as much alout contracts," one of our
appellate judges sadly remarked of a group of law students dispersing
and discussing as they left their contracts class.
The judge was right. The opinions do reflect a failing memory of
the bird's eye view of contract law as a body of integrated and logical
principles. Though the techniques of interpretation (determination of the
intent of the parties, or a speaker) have not been forgotten, the classic
analytical tools of construction that judges were taught to use in law
school seem to have been left there for a new generation of students
to learn and forget.'
The indictment does not lie for contracts integrated in a single
written instrument. \Vith these our courts do well. The oral contract
is our nemesis.
For example, if the question in a case is "Was there a contract?"
the opinions make no mention of excursion through the indispensable
preliminaries like "Was there an offer?"
Naturally this depends on a still more preliminary inquiry, that of
interpretation:
(a) "Did the speaker promise anything definite? Did he ask for
a promise as an acceptance-to be indicated by words, or
perhaps iinpliedly, by some small act, like the beginning
of performance, from which a promise to perform could be
implied?
(b) Or did lie instead ask for a performance, rather than a
promise, as an acceptance?"
These are questions of intention. Only after interpretation of words
used, in the light of all circumstances, objectives apparently intended etc.,
*The article covers cases following the last survey period, 96 So.Zd through 113
So.2d. Excepted are most contract cases concerning land, insurance, domestic relations,
workmens' compensation, mistake, as well as those involving constitutional law since
these are treated in other articles. Federal cases have been arbitrarily omitted.
" Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. The commentator makes no apologies for stating first principles. This article
does not purport to be a complete refresher course, however. Recommended for that
purpose are the excellent students' editions of SIMPSON, CONTRACTS (1954), WnoILISTON,
CONTRACTS (1938) and CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1952). Publishers will deliver in plain
wrapper on request.
CONTRACTS
call the court construe them to be an offer. Only then can the court
construe the offer to be one for a unilateral contract, or for a bilateral
contract. Only then can it decide whether an acceptance has occurred,
or whether communication of acceptance was necessary. Only then call
it construe it to be a bargain, for a consideration.
But one can look long and hard in the cases for the words "offer,"
"acceptance," "bargain," "bilateral contract," "unilateral contract." The
omission of labels leaves the reader wondering how the court found a
contract and why it used the rules it seemed to think were applicable.
Admittedly when questions of intent are submitted to a jury, as
they usually are, the general verdict does obscure the theory of the case. Still,
how can an appellate court decide whether there was evidence from
which a jury could find a contract without reconstructing some theory of
the case?
Even when these questions are for the court, as in determining the
sufficiency of a complaint, the words "offer," "acceptance," etc., are
conspicuously absent. Facts are stated higgledy-piggledy at length, without
comment.
Is the contract teacher's life misspent? Or are the judges wrong
in not stating their constructions?
The real culprits are no doubt the lawyers who also have an astounding
capacity for forgetting. Statements of shocked disapproval by supreme
court justices might help to alter this.
The failure to analyze in print has serious consequences because it
leads to further defects in reasoning.
Take, for instance, the action by a real estate broker for a commission. 2
Most often these cases are framed on a theory that the owner promised
to pay a commission in exchange for production (a performance, not
a promise) of a customer ready, willing and able to pay a price fixed
in advance by the owner. A court then may determine that there was
evidence from which the jury could infer that such a promise was
intended; or it may hold as a matter of law that this is the proper inter-
pretation. Once this interpretation is made,: there is no choice to construe
2. The example may seem unfair since Florida courts are not alone in their
peculiar treatment of broker's cases. See 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 50 (1950). The more
general point is best illustrated by them, however.
3. This interpretation may not be the only possibility, of course, and it is here
that a court has the most latitude in shaping the case-while the offer is yet in the
realm of intent. Did the owner apparently request a performance of the broker? Or did
he, rather, want a promise to do something, perhaps a promise to use diligent effort to
procure a purchaser, the owner conditioning his duty to pay on production of the
customer, and perhaps on the further condition that a contract to purchase be effected.
If an owner gives an exclusive right of some kind, it may be inferred reasonably that
he does want a promise to use diligent effort in return, possibly to be signified by some
relatively insignificant act from which such a promise is to be inferred. For the many
possibilities of interpretation in brokers' contracts, see I CORBIN, CONTRACTs § 50
(1950). The offer is the sole determinant of the acceptance and the performance.
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it as anything but an offer for a unilateral contract, a promise given
to induce a performance. It is merely an offer.4 Until the performance
requested by such an offer is given there can be no acceptance and no
contract."
Suppose then, that after the broker has taken subrstantial steps to
procure a purchaser and is continuing his effort, the owner tells the broker
that lie does not care to sell after all, but later does sell to the broker's
customer?
This is a revocation of an offer. But Florida courts, understandably
anxious to aid the broker, treated so unfairly, timidly speak of an
''employment agreement" -despite an initial interpretation of a promise
in exchange for a performance, and without shifting gears proceed to
make the broker whole as if there had been a bilateral contract from
the beginning.0
There is no need for such perversion of principle and reason under
the facts stated. The court can maintain its interpretation, properly
construe it to be an offer for a unilateral contract and then apply the
mitigating doctrine stated in Restatement of Contracts. Section 45 penalizes
the owner for revoking his offer under these circumstances, i.e., after the
broker has taken substantial steps in beginning performance.7 Under this
rule, the owner's offer is accompanied by a collateral implied promise
not to revoke his offer after the broker has taken substantial steps in
beginning his performance.
The owner also promises, collaterally, not to refuse a performance if
tendered. So if the owner does refuse a tender before he has communicated
a revocation of his offer, or before the happening of some other event
terminating the offer, he will be liable for the full commission. 8
Unless a court follows this course, it will apply rules applicable only
to bilateral contracts, which these arc not, by the court's own interpretation.
Worse, as different fact situations are presented, logical extension of the
bilateral contract construction further compounds the confusion.
While the function of this survey series is to survey merely-to
note what the courts have done and why, briefly assessing changes -it is
4. I XVniItsro . CoNrRACTS § 60 (3d ed. 1957): 1 CoRBIN, CONTRAC'TS § 50
(1950).
5. Ibid.
6. In an early article there is an apt comment on this mechanism: "The opinion
goes on to say that after part performance of an offer for a unilateral contract 'the
contract had taken on a bilateral character.' '[his is a remarkable instance of confusion
of thought. By what magic the offer lad turned into a 'contract' does not appear."
Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other Than a Counter Promise, 23 I lAv. L.
Rrv. 159, 164 (1910), SELECTED READINCS ON CONTRACTs 203, 296 (1931), cited in
PATTERsoN & COBLE, CASIS ON CoNrACTS 181 (4th ed. 1957).





impossible to do this with oral Florida contract cases. Since the brokers'
cases (usually oral) outnumber all others, and because they are so
misunderstood they are treated in this article in a body in the section
entitled Offer and Acccptance. To assess these opinions (if not the
decisions) more than superficial comment is required. Soni critical analysis
is necessary; much of this is relegated to footnotes.
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
The above implications are apparent in McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte,9
one of our few supreme court cases involving a broker's commission during
the survey period. The broker had a verdict in an action in which he
alleged that the owner had promised him a commission for production
of a customer ready, willing and able to purchase the McAllister Hotel
for a price and at terms acceptable to the owner. Characterizing this an
"employment agreement" the court found the determining point to be
whether the broker had performed this agreement. The court construed
"acceptable to the owner" to require "actual agreement" 0 between owner
and customer as a condition precedent to the owner's duty to pay."
The court then observed, pursuing its evident assumption that there
was a bilateral contract, that in such a case the owner obviously has
"broad discretion in determining acceptability of terms"; further, that
the test of adequate performance by the broker is not whether the owner
ought to be satisfied but whether he actually is satisfied. Since the court
had already held agreement between owner and customer necessary, its
reasons for these observation are obscure. If the court regarded this as
a bilateral contract with an express condition of satisfaction, its guarded
remark about "broad discretion" (indicating limits) might be in deference
to the mutuality rule that both parties must be bound; neither can have
a "free way out." Mutuality of obligation is applicable only to bilateral
contracts; it is obviously inapplicable to unilateral contracts which involve
a promise by only one of the parties. 2 The court may have meant only
to hedge for future protection of brokers, by suggesting that while it
does appear that the broker assumes the risk that the owner and prospect
will never come into agreement, he does not assume the risk of the
owner's refusal to negotiate. In these cases it is fair to imply a collater l
9. 98 So,2d 781 (Fla. 1957).
10. The court's discussion made it apparent that a formal contract was not
conternplated.
11. Assuming an interpretation in conformity with the complaint, the teacher
probably would say, "The owner made ain offer for a unilateral contract, a promise to
pay a commission in exchange for a customer ready, willing and able to purchase (as both
performance and acceptance), the owner conditioning his duty to pay on agreement
between owner and customer on all material terms." Since the court also used the
" condition" construction, the results in this case would he the same. But under other
facts the court's reasoning and its dicta make its direction uncertain.
12. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152 (1950).
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implied promise by the owner making such an offer, at least to enter
negotiations.' 3
However, the owner in this case had negotiated extensively with the
broker's prospect: they had not come into agreement on terms usually
regarded as material in a deal of this magnitude. Furthermore, the owner
had indicated that their agreement, if any, should be dependent on its
reduction to writing. For these reasons, finding that the broker had not
"perfornecd," the supreme court correctly reversed.
Mellet v. -lenry"14 also is typical. The evidence showed and the
court held that the broker was employed to find a purchaser ready, willing
and able to purchase a hotel for $225,000. The owner later set a price of
$219,000 but instructed the broker to submit any offer he might get.
rhrough an advertisement the broker found an interested prospect to whom
he "gave details and financing" and sent him to the seller to show the
hotel. Although the broker did not accompany the prospect he immediately
notified the seller that the prospect was his. A week later the owner notified
the broker that she had decided to remove the property from the market.
Six days later she sold the property to the same prospect.
Finding the question to be whether the broker was the procuring
cause of the sale' 5 (a question of fact) the court stated that physical
introduction of prospect to owner is "not so important" when a sale
goes through as when it does not. The court then said "[T]he law protects
a broker against cancellation of his contract when the cancellation repre-
sents a bad faith effort to defeat a commission,"'t and found the evidence
sufficient to support a verdict for the broker. The court did not mention
offer and acceptance.
In Salter v. Knowles, 7 the court affirmed the judgment for defendant
of a trial court trying without a jury a broker's action for a commission
upon his allegation that he had been employed to produce a purchaser
ready, willing and able to buy at a price acceptable to the owner and
had done so. The proof showed that the broker was employed to find a
purchaser at a fixed price which lie did not do, and therefore could not
recover. The court added that even if tic had been "employed" to find a
purchaser at a price acceptable to the owner,'8 as he had alleged, there
* 13. Costilla Land Co. v. Robinson, 238 F.2d 105 (10th Cir. 1956).
14. 108 So.2d 69 (Fla. App, 1959).
15. See 3 MIAMi L.Q. 424, 427 (1949), for discussion of the "procuring cause"
doctrine (current in sonic other states also), permitting recovery by a broker who procures
a customer, ready, willing and able on terms other than those in his "contract" of
employment. Continuing negotiations by the broker may show that lie was the procuring
cause, Shuicr v. Allen, 76 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1955). The cases do not discuss a "new offer"
or even a modifying "contract."
16. See Anot., Broker's right to commission on sales consummated after termination
of employment, 27 A.L.R.2d 1348 (1953). The treatment of the subject in this annota-
tion, the onission of all discussion of offer and acceptance, indicates the reason for the
widespread conflict in these cases. The fact of agency, "the enployment" seems to
give rise to the supposition that there is always a "contract" to pay a commissiom.
17. 97 So.2d 138 (Fla. App. 1957).




was lack of continuous negotiation and no showing that his service was
thc procuring cause of the sale.' Applying the usual presumption of
correctness to the finding of fact in the lower court, the district court
held the findings of the trial court not clearly against the weight of
the evidence.
A purchaser was held liable for a 5% commission under an implied
contract, a district court held in affirming a summary judgment for a
broker against a purchaser in Lamborn v. Slack.20 'IThe evidence showed
that the broker had informed the defendant purchaser, then living in
Sweden, of his listing of a newspaper business. Upon the purchaser's
request for further information the plaintiff broker wrote, naming the
paper and giving other pertinent details; but stated that because the seller
would not pay a commission "[t]he only plan is for you to consider our
commission of 5% in any price you might agree on . . . " and requested
a letter to this effect. The defendant replied that he had asked a relative
to negotiate with the seller, and then requested the broker to write to
the relative giving suggestions on how to proceed, saying "filf we come
to a dcal, I am sure the price can be agreed in a way by which your help
and work will be taken care of." Accordingly the broker did write defendant's
relative, suggesting an approach to the seller (who was elderly and difficult),
mentioning a 5% commission to be paid by the purchaser. A sale resulted.
The court held that it was immaterial that the broker was not the procuring
cause of the sale since the sale was not what the purchaser was bargaining
for; he bargained for aid to the relative. Interpreting the final letter from
the defendant, the court inferred a promise to pay a 5% commission if
the purchase were completed, saying that the defendant requested aid
to the relative 2t and did nothing to disabuse the plaintiff of his expectation
of a 5% commission.
22
19. See Mellet v. lenry, supra note 14.
20. 107 So.2d 277 (Fia. App. 19581.
21. To the challenge "inadequacy of consideration" the court reiterated the usual
rule that adequacy is immaterial; that merely detriment to the promisee is sufficient. Nor
is pecuniary benefit to the promisor requisite. Thus, "aid to the relative" is sufficient
consideration.
22. On-, can quarrel with this inference and conclusion as a matter of law, bearine
in mind that the defendant is entitled to any inferences in his favor that a jury could
make. The plaintiff, in his second letter proposed, apparently, that he should furnish
the usual services-negotiation with the owner directly, in exchange for a promise to
pay 5%. The defendant countered with a different proposition, that the broker aid his
brother-in-law, i.e,. requested a different service. The broker could not reasonably believe
that his orightal invitation (or even offer) having reference to 5% for conducting the
actual negotiations with the owner, with all the work that entailed, would also have
reference to the defendant's offer to pay for a different service. The defendant's offer
then would be, "'I promise to pay you a reasonable commission for aid to the relative."
The broker's later letter to the relative could not be a counter-offer and rejection
because though this letter reiterated the statement that 5% was expected, the aid was
furnished in the same letter, and the defendent never had an opportunity to reject it.
An offerce must have an opportunity to reject an offer. This being so, the broker
accepted the defendant's offer or none at all, and should be entitled to a reasonable price
or nothing. It may well be that 5% is reasonable, but this was not the court's theory.
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Moylan v. Estes'a brings hope to the broker who cannot recover on
his express contract for a commission because of failure of an express
condition. In an earlier action between the same parties, 2 4 the supreme
court had construed the express contract to require a consummated sale
of certain land upon specified terms and price. Though the owner and
prospect procured by the broker had entered into a contract of sale, the
sale was not consummated and recovery was denied. The supreme court
suggested that the broker might deem it advisable to sue on an implied
contract, possibly since it appeared that after the land contract had been
abandoned by owner and purchaser they secretly entered into negotiations
which resulted in a sale of a portion of the land. Responding to the
suggestion, the broker brought this action against the owner on an implied
contract.
The trial court, however, gave summary judgment for the owner,
applying the rule that one cannot recover on an implied contract when
the subject matter is express; and held that there could be no implied
contract since the broker had not continued negotiations with the purchaser
with the knowledge of the owner.
The district court revcrscd and remanded, finding that the express
contract between owner and broker could have been abandoned and that
they might have tacitly entercd anothcr, the owner impliedly promising to
pay a commission for the land actually sold. The court cited Corbin: 26
The fact that an express contract for a commission was made
between principal and agent does not prevent the finding of a
different promise by implication where the services contemplated
in the express contract were never rendered. The acceptance by
the principal of a different service, knowing that the agent cxpected
pay for rendering it, justifies the finding that the agent expected
reasonable price?
Ilhe court found "continuous negotiation" unnecessary because of the
rule that where a party contracts to do a certain thing he impliedly
promises to do nothing to hinder or obstruct (the brokcr's) performance. 28
[Yet if there were no negotiation, from what facts could a new promise be
implied?]
23. 102 So.2d 855 (1,a. App. 1958).
24. Estes v. tloylan, 94 So.2d 362, 366 (Fla. 1957).
25. Implied in fact, not implied in law (quasi-contract).
26. 3 CoRBIN, CONIRACTS § 567 (1951).
27. Corbin, ibid, probably mearis that the broker offers a reverse unilateral contract
-a performance (production of a customer, ready, etc., to pay a price acceptable to
the owner) in exchange for the owner's promise to pay the broker a reasonable
commission, inferrible from the owner's act in accCpting the customer aud selling to
him. Students will recognize this as a "red flag situation" as described in PA'rI-unSON
& ConI,, CAsEs oN CONTRACTS 105 (4th ed. 1957), example (7)(e), except that the
casebook example presupposes an offer which is also a promise.




Golden Heights Land Company v. Norman Babel Mortgage Company29
also involved a broker's action to recover a commission. Here the owner
conditioned its promise to pay out of particular funds, creation of the
funds dependent upon securing certain subordination agreements which
without its fault it had been unable to do. The trial court, finding that
there could be no recovery on the express contract because the condition
had not happened, nevertheless permitted recovery on an implied contract.
The appellate court reversed on the general principle that where there
is an express contract in existence the law will not imply a contract in
contravention of it, stating that it had not overlooked its own decision in
Moylan v. Estes."0 Presumably in the instant case the court saw no facts
from which it might infer that the express contract was no longer in
existence as in Moylan, where recovery for beneficial services was allowed.
The court, however, did not mention the distinguishing fact. Had it done
so the decision would have been more valuable.
The court in Sawyer v. Hime3' construed the following provision in
a broker's contract not to be a promise to pay only out of a particular
fund (which had not materialized), but rather a means of determining
the amount of the commission: "Commission for securing lessee, 5% for
the first 5 years, 3% for the next 5 years and 2%, for the balance of the
lease." The amount was to be graduated downward, based on the length
of the term upon which the leasing parties might agree, that is -the
longer the term, the less, proportionately, the commission. The court's
inference as to the intention of the parties was strengthened by evidence
of the meaning which the parties themselves gave when the defendant
obtained from the broker his consent to defer payment of half the full
commission for some months, thus indicating their belief that the commnis-
sion was presently due, and negativing any belief that it should be paid only
if the lease were not breached and the rent paid. The summary judgment
for the broker was accordingly affirmed.
In Melvin v. West,32 a district court reviewed the evidence to determine
whether it supported a judgment for the broker in his action against the
landowner for a commission, and held that it did not. The owner bad
orally listed his property with several brokers, including the plaintiff, with
the "distinct understanding" that the first broker to bring in a signed
contract"" to purchase at a certain price would be entitled to a commission.
The plaintiff produced a prospect who was unwilling to pay the price,
but to whom the owner made an offer to sell at a lesser price, the broker
29. 102 So.2d 858 (Fla. App. 1958).
30. 102 So.2d 855 (Fla. App. 1958).
31. 109 So.2d 193 (Fla. App. 1959).
32. 107 So.2d 156 (Fla. App. 1958).
33. The court said there are "two types of brokerage contracts in Florida": one for
production of a customer ready, etc.; the other, to effect a sale, which requires a signed
contract or an effected sale. This is of the latter type. "There are at least two types
would have been a more accurate statement.
542 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
participating in the negotiations. Before the prospect accepted his offer,
however, another broker, acting under the original listing produced a signed
contract with another customer for the full price.
The court construed the plaintiff's "brokerage contract" to be one
in modification of the earlier "listing contract" incorporating all its terms,
including that for payment of the commission to the first broker to produce
a signed contract, but for a lesser sales price." Since the other broker
brought in a signed contract before the plaintiff brought in his, "the
plaintiff's contract was terminated" as a matter of law. (The plaintiff's
power to perform was cut off by the happening of a condition?)
'lhe answer to the plaintiff's contention that the owner had prevented
his complete performance (thus excusing it as a condition to the owner's
duty to perform, entitling him to the commission) was that the owner
did not prevent performance; the plaintiffs own "contract" did, with the
happening of the condition-the procuring by another broker of a prior
contract of sale with another. :n
In LaIow v. Codo1pzo, "l involving a broker's employmcnt "agreement,"
the court interpreted and construed the time term for the broker's perform-
ance. "After we take title to the property that we on this day contracted
to trade for our property. (sic) We hereby give you an Exclusive Right
of sale for a period of six months from the time we take title of (sic) the
property. . . ,"37 This was held to mean that "employment" began imme-
diately, so that though the broker produced a customer (whose offer was
accepted) prior to the owner's own acquisition of title, the broker was
entitled to his commission upon the happening of the condition that
the owner acquire title. The court does not use the word "condition," and
fogs understanding of its theory of this aspect of the case by saying, "Even
if it should be said that the plaintiff was not entitled to a commission at
the time a purchaser was produced, it could not be said that le was not
entitled to a commission after his principal took title, and the exclusive
right of sale became effective and his principal sold the property."
An unusual fact situation is presented in Mitchell v. Mercer.38 The
broker happened also to hold the legal title to the land which he had
34. The commentator would say the owner made a new offer to the broker on tie
same terms except for the sales price.
35. The commentator would say that the offer lapsed.
36. 101 So.2d 390 (Fa. 1958).
37. On these facts there might be either of two interpretations of the writing:
(I "1 promise to pay a commission in exchange for your implied promise to use diligent
effort to procure acu stomer ready, etc., (perhaps) on condition a sale is effected, and
on condition I acquire title." (construe as an offer for a bilateral contract, perhaps
asking as an acceptance a return promise to be implied from beginning performance);
or (2) "1 promise to pay a commission in exchange for your procuring a purchaser,
ready, etc., but I condition my doty to pay on my own acquisition of title." (construe
as an offer for a unilateral contract, to be accepted by procuring a customer, but the
duty to pay conditioned on acquisition of title by the owner).
38. 101 So.2d 19 (Fla. App. 1958).
[VOL. XIV
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previously sold on contract for deed to his present employer, from whom
he sought a commission in the instant case. Their contract for deed
provided for a total price of $12,000 with deferred payments of $75 a
month, the vendee having the right to assign to a purchaser assuming the
deferred payments.
After $2,000 had been paid, the vendee, owner of the equity, employed
the broker upon an exclusive listing for sale at $15,000 total price with
"down payment open." The broker did procure a signed contract to
purchase at $15,000, with a deposit and promise to pay a sum equalling
$4,200 by the time of closing, and a promise to pay the balance at $80
per month to the original vendor (the broker) under the contract for
deed. Consideration for the promise to purchase was to be an assignment
of the contract for deed. The employer rejected the proferred contract
and the customer.
In this action for a broker's commission, the employer contended the
broker had not earned his commission; that the employment agreement
"down payment open" meant terms acceptable to himself; that accordingly
he had a right to demand all cash or cash enough for the means to secure
his own release under the contract for deed.
But the district court found that while it was fair to imply the
employer's promise to take cash because the employment agreement had
left the terms open, his promise had to be interpreted in the light of the
existence of the contract for deed.39 Under it the employer had only a
limited interest: He had a right to sell only this interest.40 On it he
could put any value he chose. But in the employment agreement he had
prescribed a total selling price for the land of $15,000. Of this, the balance
remaining on the contract for deed was about $10,000. The employment
agreement and contract for deed thus disclosed the value he placed on
his equity, approximately $5,000. He could demand no more, the court
held, and allowed the broker his commission.
However proper the court's conclusion that the employer promised to
take $5,000 cash for his interest, it does not seem proper also to imply the
employer's promise to accept a purchaser contracting to assume larger
payments than those provided under the contract for deed. The vendor
had already consented under the original contract for deed to future
assignment and assumption of the deferred payments ($75 a month) by
an assignee to the vendor. To this the prospective assignor had an unques-
tionable right. As vendor, the broker could not have demanded that the
39. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 235, comment on clause (d) (1932).
40. Aside from this, the offeree-broker would have no reason to believe anything
else, since the employer's offer to the broker contemplated an assignment by the employer
to a prospective purchaser, presumably in accord with the terms of the existing contract
for deed.
19601
544 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
vendee assign only upon different terms, at $80 per mnonth. 41 If the vendor-
obligor could thus alter his contract permitting assignment, diminishing
the right of the vendee-obligee by enlarging the terms upon which he
could assign, he could demand an increase of not merely $5 a month
but $500. If he could not increase the terms as vendor, then is it reasonable
to infer the employer's promise to him as broker to pay a commission for
procuring a purchase contract on any terms which the broker might set?
If the broker could not enlarge the terms of assignment in his capacity
as vendor, why should he be permitted to do it in his capacity as broker?
If the employer had accepted the proferred contract of purchase, in
the event of later default by the new purchaser, he would hardly be in a
position (as assignor) to claim a novation releasing him from liability.42
But if he did not accept the customer (as here) he must pay the broker,
who in actuality has been permitted by the court to dictate the terms of
his own employment. ro infer that the employer promised the broker carte
blanche is unreasonable, T-7he dual status occupied by this broker should
have given the court pause.
In Alex D. Smith Real Estate, Inc. v. Gables Venetian Waterways,
- Inc.,4' the plaintiff broker, seeking to recover a 10% commission, sued the
owner upon a contract giving him an exclusive right of sale, the owner
agreeing "to pay the Broker upon consummation of any sales the sum of
10% of the selling price . . .," but further providing that the owner could
terminate the contract at any time it might wish to do so upon payment to
the broker of $45.40 for each acre remaining "unsold." The owner did ter-
minate by notice, giving as a reason the fact that a sale of 263 of 365 acres was
contemplated. lie in fact had already entered into a contract to do so,
at $2000 per acre. First holding that under an exclusive right to sell
contract the broker is entitled to a commission even though a sale was
arranged by the owner and not procured by the broker, the court then
held that the land contracted to be sold was not "unsold" within the
meaning of the promise to pay 10%; that the phrase "upon consummation
of any sales" did not require closing to constitute a sale, but merely made
consummation a condition precedent4 4 to the owner's duty to pay the
commission. Termination of the brokerage contract after "sale" then, was
a bad faith effort to avoid payment of the commission. The court made
it clear, however, that the percentage commission would be due only if
the sale were consumnated, and returned that question to the trial court.
41. To do so would be an obvious breach.
42. An offer of novation, like any other offer, depends upon intent. 'The broker here
made it clear when lie proferred the purchase contract that Tie had no intent to discharge
the original debtor; therefore, he made no offer of novation.
43. 98 So.2d 372 (Fla. App. 1957).
44. The court did not use the label "condition."
[VOL. XIV
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At least three cases involved questions relating to the fiduciary rela-
tionship between real estate broker and his principal, the owner. In one,45
the fact that this relationship is also one of public trust was emphasized
by the court in its holding that a broker who violated the terms of his
listing by negotiating a sale to a non-Christian and concealing the fact
from the owner was subject to disciplinary action by the state. 4" Conceal-
ment of the fact that the purchaser was an employee in the broker's office
was also held to be a breach of trust in the same case.47 On the other
hand, it is no breach of faith for a broker to make his own offer to
purchase while withholding from his principal knowledge that he has
another offer for more than his own, but less than the amount fixed by
the owner, even though the listing also provided for payment of a commission
on "any other deal acceptable to us." 48
A contract by husband and wife to sell a homestead was held to exist
notwithstanding the agreement left for future agreement the terms of a
release clause to be inserted in the purchase money mortgage. 49 Holding
that in subsidiary portions of the agreement it is not necessary that absolute
certainty be present, the court noted that the only uncertainty was the
amount to be paid for each individual release, but not to exceed a total
equal to the amount of the mortgage. The court noted that the seller,
who refused to perforn, did not raise the question of indefiniteness at
the time of refusal.
One who goes into equity claiming part performance to take an
oral contract out of the land section of the statute of frauds 0 must, of
course, prove the existence of a contract. Where the oral contract is to
devise land by will," more than a preponderance of evidence is necessary
to prove the contract because of the fact that usually the promisor has
died and "his lips are sealed by death" before any claim is made. In the
instant case52 the deceased had merely expressed an intention to make
a.will leaving his home to his housekeeper; he had not promised to do
so, the court found. Testimony of witnesses was replete with statements
like "He said he was 'going to' leave the property to (the housekeeper) .'
'
45. MacGregor v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 99 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1958). The
court did not determine the more interesting question whether enforcement of such a
contract would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, observing that this question was not presented by these facts.
46. FA. STAT. § 475.25 (1957).
47. See to the same effect, Chisman v. Moylan, 105 So.2d 186 (Fla. App. 19581.
48. Lalow v. Codomo, 101 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1958). It would seem that this offer was
in the alternative; if so, the decision is questionable.
49. Stone v. Austin, 107 So.2d 232 (Fla. App. 1958).
50. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1957).
51. This cause was tried prior to the effective date of FLA. STAT. § 731.051 (1957).
The new statute makes unenforceable any agreement to make a will to give a legacy or
make a devise unless the agreement be in writing and signed by the person whose estate
is sought to be charged.
52. Cable v. Miller, 104 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1958).
53. To the same effect is Traurig v. Spear, 102 So.2d 165 (Fla. App. 1958) in
which the evidence is extensively reviewed; also Lashua v. Cooper, 97 So.2d 39 (Fla.
App. 1957).
1960]
546 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
A. M. Kidder 6 Co. v. Turner 4 raised the question whether acceptance
by silence had occurred as a matter of law. The action was brought by a
stock brokerage firm against its customer for failure to deliver stock
upon his alleged contract to do so. In the language of the trade such a
contract is apparcntly known as "an open order, effective until cancelled."
An instrument so entitled, stating in effect "We have from you such
an order to sell x shares of stock at x dols" was sent, received and read by
the customer.
The court held that the instrument was a mere offer, that its receipt
could not impose on the customer the duty of repudiation under penalty
of having a contract imposed on him; but that retention of the receipt,
together with all surrounding circumstanccs might indicate acceptance.
Circumstances to be considered were such matters as length of time the
customer's account had been open, the number of confirmations the
customer had received, the practice of the broker in making demands
(for margin) or giving notice of sale, etc. "
It would seem that this is mercly a specialized application of the
general rule enunciated in the old Feclskin case " so familiar to students.
Acceptance may be inferred from silence where there is a course of dealing
indicating that an offeree's silence means acceptance. Since the inferences
to be drawn in the instant case were conflicting, the trial judge's denial
of the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict was correct; and since there
was evidence from which the jury could find for the defendant, the
judgment for the defendant was affirmed.
In Kitchens v. King 7 the court, after examining the evidence upon
a question whether the defendant's motions for a directed verdict should
have been granted, found the defense of accord and satisfaction '," had
not been proved, and that it was a jury question. The action arose upon
an alleged contract in 1952 by defendant with her parents to build a home
for them, and upon which they had paid defendant $4,000 to start it,
receiving her written acknowledgment for the payment and its purpose.
The plaintiff alleged that defendant had neither built nor returned the
money. The only material evidence of the defense of accord and satisfaction
was the execution, delivery and recording of a deed to the parents for a
life interest with remainder over to the defendant; and delivery of possession
to the parents. The "Dead Man's Statute" precluded the defendant from
testifying further. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
54. 106 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1958).
55. The supreme court of Florida, more frequently than the district courts of appeal,
in its opinions cites specialized texts which help to orient the reader in the subiect, an
admirable practice-however important may be the facts in the case.
56. Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co.. 158 Mass. 194, 33 N.E. 495 (1893).
57. 102 So.2d 414 (Fla. App. 1958).




In J. A. Cantor Associates, Inc. v. Blutne," the question was whether
under the evidence it appeared that an accord and satisfaction existed as
a matter of law. In this action for a real estate commission, the evidence
showed that the plaintiff, a real estate salesman and his employer had
entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff should receive 50% of
commissions paid upon property sold by the plaintiff; that the plaintiff
procured a purchaser, but that the deal was closed by some one else in
the firm because the plaintiff was out of town; that for this reason defendant
wrote plaintiff that it would pay him only 25%; plaintiff protested by
letter; both parties maintained their positions in exchange of several letters;
defendant finally wrote that he would pay no more and "if you are
satisfied, I will gladly send you your share. . . ." To this the plaintiff
replied that though a grave injustice had been done him, he would not
attempt reprisal, and "It will be acceptable to deposit the check to my
account .. " The check was deposited.
The appellate court held that the intention to enter into an accord
was to be garnered from the letters; that the parties, without objecting
that it was a jury question had permitted the trial court to draw inferences
to determine the fact; that it could not be said conclusively that the
trial court's conclusions were wrong. The court found that there was "no
negotiation and no offer to compromise an unliquidated claim. . . . Each
party maintained an exact amount as due, and acceptance of a part
payment could not be said as a matter of law to have terminated the
dispute." 0
The court noted that the letters were subject either to defendant's
interpretation - that he had issued an "ultimatum", which the plaintiff
had accepted; or to the plaintiff's interpretation - that he had not accepted
an ultimatum (offer) but had simply refused to carry the argument further.
One wonders what the court had in mind. If the defendant made no
offer (as the court had already concluded) niothing that the plaintiff said
or did could be an acceptance.0' But if the defendant did make an offer
("I promise to pay an amount admittedly due in exchange for your
promise to discharge the disputed debt"), it is doubtful, under the objective
theory of contracts, whether, despite his ambiguous letter, the plaintiff
could cash the check and still deny his acceptance. 2
Quite another matter would be the sufficiency of the defendant's
promise (or even payment) of an amount admittedly due as consideration
for a promise by the plaintiff to discharge a disputed claim.0 3 Though
one cannot quarrel with the result, the theory of the case is obscure.
59. 106 So.d 603 (Fla. App. 1958).
60. No cases are cited.
61. 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1277 (1951).
62. Id. § 1279.
63. Id. §§ 1289, 1290, nn. 95, 96. See note 2 supra. It is possible that the court had
this in mind.
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CONSIDERATION
The most interesting case involving sufficiency of consideration and
the preexisting duty rule is Casa Marina Hotel Company v. Barnes.6 4 The
holding, affirmed by a district court (certiorari denied by the supreme
court) seems clearly wrong. The plaintiff owed the defendant a debt
(not yet due) represented by a note and mortgage giving the debtor the
option to pay before maturity. The plaintiff, desiring to sell the mortgaged
property free of the mortgage, told the defendant that he would prepay
the debt if the defendant would forego interest accrued to the time of
sale. The defendant agreed, contingent on her attorney's approval. When
approval was not forthcoming, the defendant promised that if the plaintiff
would prepay the principal and accrued interest, she would refund the
interest at a later date. The plaintiff did pay early but the defendant refused
to refund the interest and this action to recover it resulted.
The court held that for this new promise of the defendant, the
plaintiff did nothing he was not already bound to do; he paid an admittedly
due debt. While the court doubtless would recognize the general rule that
payment of a debt before maturity is a new detriment to the promisee," '
it seemed to think that because the original contract contained a provision
enabling the debtor to pay early, he did only what he was bound to do.
The court overlooked the fact that the original contract provided for
alternative performances-to pay early or pay on the due date. The
debtor was under no legal duty to pay early; by paying early he gave
up his legal right to pay on the due date." Correlatively, the creditor
received something to which she was not previously entitled to demand,
payment early, a benefit in law. The court was in error when it stated that
the only benefit redounded to the debtor who was thus enabled to sell his
property free of the mortgage. It confused benefit in fact which is imma-
terial, with benefit in law, which is essential to establish the fact of bargain.6
7
This creditor asked for and received something to which she was not at
the time legally entitled: This is consideration.
The preexisting duty rule was in issue again in a suit for mortgage
foreclosure but was found inapplicable in Manufacturers 6 Traders Trust
Company v. First National Bank in Fort Lauderdale."" The mortgagors
had borrowed from the plaintiff bank on an unsecured note. While in
default they executed a 90 day renewal note secured by a mortgage. The
court held that though the mortgage was taken for a pre-existing debt, the
extension of time by the creditor contemporaneously with the taking of the
64. 105 So.2d 204 (H-a. App. 1958), cert. denied, 109 So.2d 574 (Fa. 1959).
65. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 121 (3d ed. 1957).
66. Corbin says, "If one has an option between two performances, the giving up of
this option, or the exercise of it in one way rather than the other, is a sufficient
consideration for a return promise." I CORBIN, CON'rRACTS § 182 (1950).
67. 1 XWIrLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 102a (3d ed. 1957).
68. 113 So.2d 869 (Fla. App. 1959).
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mortgage was sufficient consideration for it. The definite period of forbear-
ance promised was a detriment to the plaintiff and benefit to the defendant.6 9
In Greenfield v. Millman,"0 a district court recognized the majority
rule that a preexisting duty owed or promised, even to a third person,
is insufficient consideration for a later counter promise by another person.71
But under the facts the court found that there was no preexisting duty
since under the later contract a new legal detriment was in fact promised.
After negotiating a contract for the sale of land, the seller had orally
contracted with the purchaser to subordinate his purchase money mortgage
if the seller should want to consolidate existing mortgages with uncom-
fortably early due dates in a new mortgage. On closing the land contract
the seller objected to signing the proferred subordination agreement because
its terms were different from those orally agreed on, saying he would
sign only upon the purchaser's attorney's promise to personally guarantee
the purchase money debt. The attorney did promise and in this action
against him claimed want of consideration and application of the pre-
existing duty rule because the seller was already under a legal duty to the
purchaser to subordinate.
The court correctly held, however, that the seller in promising to
subordinate on conditions different from those agreed with the third
person did promise a new legal detriment. The court's statement was that
the purchaser was promised a benefit in that his refinancing was made
easier. This is benefit in fact,12 (not in law) and is material only on
the question of motivation toward the bargain for a legal benefit -about
which there could be no question here. It was not material to whom the
consideration moved. It should be noted that the benefit in law moved
to the attorney in that lie got what he requested-the plaintiff's signature
on the new subordination agreement.
A district court struggled with two problems in Hope v. National
Airlines.'- One involved a question of consideration, the other the applica-
bility of the one year section of the statute of fraudsT 4 The trial court had
dismissed, without specifying grounds, the action of an airline pilot who
alleged that he was employed by an airline during a pilot's strike which was
causing the airline difficulty in meeting its schedules; that he was assured
that if he would work through the strike, "he would be employed perma-
nently as long as the defendant corporation was in business." Whether
the statute of frauds applied depended on interpretation of the word
69. An indefinite period would have made the creditor's promise illusory.
70. 111 So.2d 480 (Fla. App. 1959).
71. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 131 (3d ed. 1957).
72. See on the same point, Casa Marina Hotel Co. v. Barnes, 105 So.2d 204 (Fla.
App. 1958), cert, denied, 109 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1959), and note 67 supra.
73. 99 So.2d 244 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied, 102 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1958).
74. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1957).
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"permanent": If it meant "for life," it was performable within one year
because life might end, and was not within the statute. The court decided
that no lifetime contract was intended, but only one at will, because no
consideration other than the services was shown." The court admitted
that the pilot's giving up an advantage - i.e. prejudicing his right to join
a union - could be a legal detriment, but apparently thought the airline
was not bargaining for this. In view of its extraordinary promise to pay
extra in the form of permanent employment it would seem that this is
exactly what the airline was bargaining for, this benefit in addition to
services.
However, aside from this, the court then dealt with the question of
consideration, and held there was no contract because the agreement lacked
mutuality of obligation. Since the court had first found that this was a
unilateral "contract" ("the pilot never agreed to anything"), the mutuality
rule, in the nature of things, could not apply, because there is never
mutuality in a unilateral contract: By the time an offer for a unilateral
contract is accepted only one person is bound7 A third reason "indefinite-
ness," the difficulty of assessing damages for life, at best uncertain, was
ascribed by the court for its holding. Many courts would not find this an
insuperable difficulty.77 The opinion is not a success.
In Wiley v. Dow,"8 a tenant's implied promise to stay on and pay
rent was held sufficient consideration for a landlord's promise to repair
defective steps upon which the plaintiff was injured. The trial court had
dismissed on this ground a complaint which alleged a month to month
tenancy, reiterated promises to repair, the plaintiff's announcement that
he would retain the then due rent for repairs, the landlord's reply that
he would repair; the plaintiff's reliance on the promise in remaining
on as tenant, forbearing to exercise his right to terminate the status
by giving legal notice; payment of rent.
The court noted the resulting benefit to the landlord without indicating
that benefit indicates the fact of exchange or bargain. This makes more
interesting its (unlabeled) comment recognizing promissory estoppel as a
substitute for consideration, 9 though it is questionable whether the court
would have applied it had there been no conventional consideration.
"In addition . . . the complaint alleges . . . that the plaintiffs in
reliance . . . remained as tenants .... " This would seem to mean that
even if the landlord did not bargain for the promise to remain and pay
rent but merely made a gratuitous promise to repair, since he reasonably
75. Many, but not all courts follow this view. 1 CORBIN, CONrAc'rs § 96, n. 27
(1950); see also, I WILuSTON, CONTRACTS § 39 (3d ed. 1957).
76. That is, the promises of only one of the parties remain to be performed.
RE.srATENIFT, CONTRACTS § 12 (1932).
77. Obviously. See cases cited by Williston, note 75 suipra.
78. 107 So.2d 166 (Fla. App. 1958).
79. RESTATEMENT, LONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
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knew the plaintiff would rely, and as indeed lie did, lie should be estoppcd
to say there was no consideration since manifest injustice would result.
In the absence of contract, fraud or concealment a landlord is not
liable for injuries caused by failure to repair. The doctrine of promissory
estoppel, if freely applied as a substitute for consideration to support a
landlord's promise to repair could vastly alter the landlord's duty.
In a situation that seems both novel and important in Florida,
Beck v. Hodge80 seems to make the general point that it makes no differ-
ence to whom consideration moves so long as it is thus bargained for.
The trial court dismissed this mortgage foreclosure at the conclusion of
the plaintiff's evidence on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
establish "valid" consideration.
Pleadings and testimony showed that the plaintiff had paid a construc-
tion companyj$5,750 under an agreement with it to furnish it this sum
to construct ahouse for the defendant, taking in exchange the defendant's
note and mortgage for $5,850. Prior to the agreement the defendant had
told the plaintiff that the construction company was financing the project.
The construction company, however, paid the defendant mortgagor only
$2,500 and would pay no more.
A district court held that the plaintiff had established a prima facie
case, saying "we deem it unnecessary to pass on any question of whether
or not the evidence showed a valid consideration moving to the defendant."
But the holding is weakened by a finding "The $2,500 which (the mort-
gagor) admitted having received . ..negatives the decision .. . that there
was no consideration . ..alnd hence, it is necessary that we reverse this
case." The court deemed it unnecessary to decide questions of agency8' or
usury since it predicated reversal on the consideration point. The opinion
would have been clearer had the court stated its interpretation of the
defendant's promise, i.e., what did the plaintiff's evidence show the
defendant was bargaining for as consideration?
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS
The most definitive statement of the objective theory of contracts
ever made by a Florida court was made by Justice Thornal in Gendzier v.
Bielecki,Slt when he stated the rule expressed by Justice Holmes, "The
making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one
intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs-not on the
80. 101 So.2d 47 (Fla. App. 1958).
81. The court noted a New Jersey case (in which the company was not an agent
for the mortgagor) in which the mortgagee was permitted to foreclose for the amount
actually received by the mortgagor, stating that if the company had been an agent,
presumably the mortgagee could have foreclosed for the entire amount. This observation
might forecast the ultimate outcome of the case.
81a. 97 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1957).
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parties having meant the same thing, but on their having said the same
thing." (Emphasis added.) Although Justice Thornal later used the
colorful phrase "neeting of the minds," he made it clear that he meant
apparent meeting of the minds.
It was error then, for a trial court to admit evidence of the defendant's
unilateral secret intent not to agree to a document stating an account
between the plaintiff and defendant, and initialed by the defendant, who
apparently did not communicate his intent to the plaintiff. The document,
the court said, spoke for itself, presumably as the only outward manifestation
of the mutual intent of the parties. The parol evidence rule, the court
added, is not the reason for exclusion of evidence of secret (uncommuni-
cated) intent not to enter into a contract. It was unnecessary for the
court to mention that the evidence would have been excluded even though
there had been no writing.
In addition, the court held the trial court in error for refusing to
instruct the jury that initials are as effective as a full signature to bind
a party to an agreement, if it is an act in authentication of the document.
The court held that an account stated is presumptively correct and
in the absence of proof of fraud, mistake or error (not claimed here) the
correctness becomes conclusive.
Where two persons promise to make payment for goods ordered and
delivered, the contract is a joint obligation, unless the words used require
a contrary interpretation and construction. In Edward Corporation of
Miami v. David M. Woolin 6 Son, Inc., 12 a seller (the plaintiff) refused
to sell goods to the buyer "without the joinder" of the defendant "in the
obligation." The buyer and the defendant both signed an instrument
stating "The purpose of this contract note is also to receive a confirmation
by [defendants] that they authorize you [buyer] to draw this merchandise
from us on their behalf and that they will be responsible for payment
of your invoices up to the total amount of approximately $8,000."
In the lower court the defendant moved to dismiss the seller's action
for goods sold on the ground that an indispensable party (the buyer) was
not joined. The trial judge dismissed on the ground that the obligation
was joint only and the buyer was therefore an indispensable party.
The district court affirmed, holding that there were two promises
for the same act; that under these circumstances, in the absence of an
indicated intent to the contrary, a joint obligation is presumed to have
been intended. "The same act" (performance) is promised even though
one promisor is principal and the other a mere surety or guarantor. Of this,
82. 113 Sn.2d 252 (Fila. App. 1959).
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Corbin says, "One who guarantees payment of the debt of another is
always promising the same performance as is the principal debtor. This is
true even though he limits the amount of his liability."83
Applying the rule that instruments must be construed together, the
supreme court affirmed the judgment of a trial court and its holding
that the following was not a complete release: "This is to certify that
I have . . . made settlement with the Jacksonville Terminal Company
for all claims for Injuries and Damages . ".. Payments were made to the
plaintiff by the Terminal Company by vouchers with stubs, one of which
read ". . partial payment for personal injury."8' 4 This, with other corro-
borative evidence by the defendant's representative, that the first-mentioned
paper was not the form used by the company for final releases, and
further that the company did not consider the payments final, indicated
there was no conflict in evidence to go to a jury; that the trial court was
correct in holding the releases to be partial only.
In Riley Aircraft Manufacturing, Inc. v. Koppers Company, Inc.,s5
the supreme court held a circuit court in error for submitting to a jury the
question whether two sales orders involved one contract or two. Although
the orders were executed on identical forms, were signed by the same
parties and covered the sale of the same kind of merchandise (propellers),
they bore different dates, described varying quantities of goods and different
prices, and the times of deliveries were not the same. There were therefore
two contracts.
The seller attempted to justify his failure to perform the second contract
by the buyer's failure to perform the first contract. The court pointed out
that the buyer's failure.to take and promptly pay for the goods was not, in
any case, a breach of either contract, that this failure presumably, was an
implied in law condition to the seller's duty to deliver 6 only under the first
contract. The court indicated that in any event the breach of one contract
cannot justify the aggricved party in refusing to perform another contract.
In Florida National Bank of Jacksonville v. St. Anthony's Hospital,
Inc.,87 a declaratory decree was requested defining the rights and duties
under a contract between a hospital which had agreed to perform certain
services and to make money payments to the sister of the other contracting
party. The formal document provided that $65 per month should be paid,
and in addition, within the discretion of the superintendent of the
83. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 926 (1951).
84. Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Misak, 102 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1958).
85. 99 So.2d 227 (Fla. 1957).
86. Not a breach of the time term because a reasonable time had not yet elapsed?
87. 105 So.2d 198 (Fla. App. 1958).
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Hospital, "such other payments as may be necessary" at any time. The
court placed itself in the situation of the parties, considered the surrounding
circumstances, the occasion, and apparent object of the parties to determine
their intent, and from the evidence concluded that they did not intend
to make payments over $65 per month obligatory, irrespective of the
assets of the beneficiary. The attorney who drew up the contract was
permitted to testify (without objection) that full support for the beneficiary
was not intended. -Ier other income was shown to be $6,500 and assets ample,
with place to live, rent free. The court concluded that the word "necessary"
here meant "in case of need" only.
In construing a lease" providing for a "right of cancellation in case
of sale . . . or in the event any of said land is required by the lessor
for converting to pasture or for any other reason . . ."the court found
the question to be whether this language vcsted the lessor with an un-
restricted right to cancel. In applying two rules of interpretation, the
court (1) applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis and held that the reason
for cancellation must have been related in kind to the reasons specifically
stated, which precluded cancellation for the purpose of leasing to a third
party, and (2) held that since meaning must be given to all the language, had
the parties intended a completely unrestricted right to cancel, there would
have been no need for specifying even those stated.
Usual rules of interpretation of contracts were held"0 to apply to two
separately titled separation and property settlement agreements. Under one
the husband promised to set up a trust for wife and child. Under the
second agreement, executed on the same date, and in consideration of
the trust agreement, the husband promised to make certain annual
"gifts . . . so long as the wife lives and remains unmarried." A final
decree of divorce incorporated the first agreement ut not the second. The
court held that notwithstanding the use of the word "gift," the husband's
promise was not to make a gift but was clearly one in exchange for
consideration. The instruments were executed simultaneously and constituted
the entire agreement betwcen the parties, this "gift" agreement being
merely part and parcel of the overall agreement.
Collins v. National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford"' presented an
interesting problem of construction. A materialinan brought an action
against the sureties of the members of a county Board of Public Instruction"'
on the theory that the members of the board bad failed to perform their
ministerial duty of requiring the contractor to furnish a bond conditioned
88. Mann v. Thompson, 100 So.2d 634 (Fla. App. 1958).
89. Pentland v. Pentland, 113 So.2d 872 (Fla. App. 1959).
90. 105 So.2d 190 (Fin. App. 1958).
91. Note that these are sureties under a contract with the members of the Board,
not sureties under the general contractor's bond; the latter are not parties to the suit.
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in the manier prescribed by statute 2 to protect persons supplying material
and labor.
The contract between school board and general contractor provided
that the contractor should furnish all materials and that the contract
should become effective on delivery of a bond guaranteeing "performance
of the contract and as security for the payment of all persons furnishing
materials." The bond, executed with general contractor and surety as
principals and the Board of Public Instruction as obligee, provided that
the principal should "indemnify the obligec against any loss . . ." and
further, "That no right of action shall accrue . . . for the use and benefit
of any one other than the obligee named; and that the obligation of the
surety is . . . one of suretyship only. . . "
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the action on the ground
(1) that the complaint did not show that the use plaintiff was unable to
collect the debt due and (2) the bond read with the contract did protect
laborers and materialmen.
On the second point the appellate court agreed that the bond did
protect materialmen; that the purpose of Florida Statute section 255.05 is
to protect persons whose labor and materials are put into public buildings
on which they can acquire no lien, and that the bond should be construed
in the light of this section. The court distinguished Warren for the Use
and Benefit of Hughes Supply Co. v. Glen Falls Indemnity Co.,93 in which
the court held that a Board of Public Instruction had failed to demand the
statutory bond, its mandatory ministerial duty, which resulted in individual
tort liability of members of the board. In that case neither contract nor bond
included language creating the obligation called for by the statute for pro-
tection of materialmen. In the instant case, the contract required the bond
as security for payment of all persons furnishing materials; and the bond
specifically referred to the contract annexed. Read together, under usual
rules of interpretation, and in the light of the statute, the bond provided the
required statutory protection.
The court did not comment on the contract provision which denied a
right of action for the use and benefit of anyone other than the obligee-
school board, a right the statute specifically requires. The court, however,
quoted at length from a \Vest Virginia case" 4 which involved similar statu-
tory requirements, as wcll as a similar bond and contract denying the right to
sue for the use and benefit of others. In holding the bond sufficient, the
West Virginia court found this provision to be against public policy and
denied it effect. Presumably the Florida court agreed.
92. FLA. STAT, § 255.05 (1957).
93. 66 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1953).
94. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Board of Educ, 15 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1926).
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A public school teacher was held 95 to be entitled to a continuing con-
tract by virtue of relevant provisions of the Florida teacher tenure statute 0
and regulations of the state board of education."7 The court held that where
the teacher, certified to teach, though not in the field of elementary educa-
tion, was appointed to teach and taught elementary school for three years
under procedure authorizing teaching outside the certificated field, and then
became certified in the field of elementary education and was appointed to
teach for the fourth year, applied for and was refused a continuing contract,
the three years which the teacher had taught out of her certified field counted
toward the statutory probationary period, entitling her to a continuing con-
tract. The court held that reading of statutes and regulations of the state
board together required this result. At the time her "eligibility" for a con-
tinuing contract was estal)lished, (i.e., at the end of these three years of
teaching) she was properly certificated in the field of elementary education,
and upon her appointment for the fourth year she was entitled to a continu-
ing contract. The court also held that although she signed her fourth con-
tract, (only a one year contract) this did not have the cffect of extending
the probation for another year, for the contract did not mention extension
as the statute requires. As to this, the court also observed that when she
became entitled to a continuing contract, the Board had no authority to
issue any other kind. 8
A contract not to compete within a seven mile area by engaging in the
restaurant business directly or indirectly, as principal or as agent, as employer
or as employee, as officer, director, stockholder, partner (dormant, special or
otherwise), or as licensee in a business involving retail sale of food for con-
sumption on premises or for retail sale of bakery products off premises, was
held' by the supreme court to have been breached and to justify injunction
for future breach.
The evidence showed that the covenantor was supervisor of a central
commissary procuring food and handling accounting, not only for one res-
95. State ex rel. Alderman v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Palm Beach County,
105 So.2d 510 (Fla. App. 1958).
96. FLA. STAT. § 231.14 (1957) requires that every teacher have a certificate to
teach under rules prescribed by the State Board of Education (Fi'k. STAT. § 231.16
(1957)) which prescribes the types, classes and rants of certificates, the types of instruc-
tion these certificates shall cover and the requirements therefor.
FiA. ST'AT. § 231.36 (1957) provides that ". , . each member of the instructional
staff . . . who holds a regular certificate . . . and who has completed three years
of service . . . and who has been reappointed . . . for the fourth successive year,
shall be entitled to . . . a continuing contract, provided the period of service . . . may
be extended to four years when prescribed by the county board and agreed to in
writing by the employee."
97. A regulation of the State Board of Education adopted April 24, 1951 defines
the "regular" certificate as one of five types (listed) "based at least on graduation from
a standard four year college regularly covering the teaching work or the position (as
prescribed by the State Board Regulation) to which the teacher is appointed at the
time eligibility for a continuing contract is established.
98. Citing Anot., 110 A.L.R. 791, 800 (1937).
99. West Shore Restaurant Corp. v. Turk, 101 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1958).
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taurant managed by him and outside the prohibited area, but for another
within the area owned by a corporation whose principal stockholders and
officers were his father and another person with whom he had been closely
associated in negotiating the purchase of yet another restaurant within the
prescribed area, even furnishing a part of the price, though ostensibly only as
a loan.
The court noted that covenants not to compete are, in the best of circum-
stances, difficult to enforce in that violation may not be apparent and dam-
ages hard to prove; for this reason "the moral obligation of the coven-
antor, the obligation to observe, the spirit as well as the letter of the
agreement must be considered and enforced." The father and the third
party, also parties to this suit, though strangers to the covenant, were en-
joined from aiding and assisting the covenantor from violating his covenant.
The chancellor's decision, based as it was, only upon pleadings, affidavits
and depositions, was not entitled to as strong a presumption of correctness as
where the evidence is conflicting or where the chancellor heard the witnesses
himself.
A provision in a lease that the lessees should furnish the lessors an
annual audit of the lessee's business by a certified public accountant showing
the gross sales upon which the rental was to be based during the preceding
rental year was held 100 to require, not merely a compilation of sales tickets,
but application of accepted accounting practices which could prove, with
reasonable accuracy, the correctness of reported sales-this being the obvious
object of the requirement that an audit be made.
Among such methods are comparison of cash receipts, as deposited in
banks or otherwise disposed of, with reported total sales. Another compares
cost of goods sold, plus markup customary to the individual business or to
the trade, against total reported sales. The certificate of the C.P.A. should
detail the procedure followed, the records checked, and state that, based
upon such audit, the gross sales were a figure named therein. The court
held that no other information concerning the lessee's business need be given
unless the C.P.A finds it necessary.
The lower court however, entered a final decree requiring the audit
without taking testimony on the lessee's affirmative defenses of waiver and
estoppel. The appellate court reversed on this ground saying that the
lessor's conduct in accepting without objection the defective audit and rental
based thereon for three years may well have led the lessee to a change of
position in reliance thereon, as perhaps in continuing an inadequate account-
ing system, creating an estoppel. Or, a waiver might be inferred from con-
duct leading the lessee to believe that the right had been waived. No consid-
eration is necessary for such a waiver if an estoppel exists.
100. Macina v. Magurno, 100 So.2d 369 (la. 1958).
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In Reid v. Johnson, 10' a suit by a client for a declaratory decree con-
struing a contract for attorney's fees, the court emphasized the high responsi-
bility of an attorney to make an understanding as to fees clear, particularly
where the contract is made during existing employment, or where lie is upon
retainer. The burden is upon him to cstablish fairness. Ambiguities in the
contract are resolved against hin. Both rules operated in the client's favor
in the instant case, since the contract (evidenced by a letter composed by
the client), mentioned certain "advances" but did not indicate whether
they were upon an independent retainer, or whether they were to be a part
of contingent fees there provided. Further, the attorney did not establish
clearly his right to be paid for extra work from another fund.
In construing a contract a court will not presume the parties intended
an illegal performance. 02 The contract in question, one for the sale of all
the corporate stock in a corporation, called for (1) payment of the purchase
price from "net earnings", and (2) payment by the corporation-on a newly
executed note-of an existing corporate indebtedness owed to the seller, also
out of "net earnings". Two different debts were thus involved. The sellers
in this suit for a declaratory decree contended that they were entitled to be
paid both debts from operating income, without prior deduction of interest
payments (to others), and the lower court so held. The appellate court
reversed.
Both principal debts were to be paid from the same fund, since the
words used were the same, i.e., "net earnings", the court held. But payment
of the purchase price, the personal debt of the buyer, could be made lawfully
only from funds legally allocable to dividends, by Florida statute1 3 payable
only from "net earnings", by general law10 4 defined as "that amount remain-
ing after payment of interest on corporate indebtedness." Since the personal
debt and interest thereon could be made only from such a fund, and the
contract as construed called for payment of the corporate indebtedness to
the seller from the same fund, the court held that a lawful construction
required all payments (interest as well as both principal debts) to be made
from a fund from which interest paid (to others) on corporate indebted-
ness had first been deducted as an expense. Under the facts the seller had
received no payments of any kind; under the court's construction the defend-
ant corporation properly deducted interest paid to others in arriving at "net
earnings", but paradoxically, was under no duty to pay even corporate inter-
est to the seller since there were as yet no "net earnings", interest payments
to others having resulted in a net loss.
101. 106 So.2d 624 (Fla. App. 1958).
102. Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Whyte, 102 So.2d 848 (Fla. App. 1958).
103. (Or froni assets in excess of liabilities.) FL,. SrAT. § 608.52 (1957).
104. Citing 13 Ai. IUo. Corporations § 668 (1938).
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In a suit by a purchaser for specific performance, 1°' the appellate court
found the evidence sufficient to support the decree upon findings that the
contract was a usual sales contract for land, though drawn in the form of
an option at the request of the vendors in order to obtain income tax bene-
fits by postponing completion of the sale until the following year. The intent
to contract to sell was further evidenced by two checks delivered to the seller
as a deposit upon the purchase, and was so accepted according to notations
on the check, though the notation was changed to "lease" at the seller's
request for tax reasons. The court further held the seller estopped to insist
that time was of the essence as provided in the "option contract" because of
his own failure to deliver the abstract as promised. It made no difference
then that the "option" was exercised belatedly.
The general rule of interpretation, that specific or particular provisions
of agreement are to be given such effect as to supersede provisions in conflict
with them which have been stated in general terms was applied in Suncoast
Building of St. Petersburg, Inc. v. Russell.1"" The vendors in their contract
for the sale of land had disclosed the right of the federal government to
redeem the land within one year from the date of the foreclosure sale at
which the vendor had purchased the land, and had agreed either to
secure the release of the right to redemption or to fully indemnify the pur-
chaser for all damages which might accrue from redemption: but the con-
tract also provided for conveyance by warranty deed free of all encum-
brances. The deed actually tendered was not a full warranty deed but pro-
vided for the right of redemption and promised indemnification. It was held
sufficient under the rule.
Tim PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The parol evidence rule came into question in Bessemer Properties,
Inc. v. Barber.10 7 While parol evidence may not be admitted to var or
contradict a writing, if the writing does not embody the entire agreement
obviously the rule does not apply. Whether an agreement does embody the
entire agreement (i.e. is integrated) depends on the intent of the parties.
In determining that intent, courts follow either of two rules: (I ) \Villiston'1 s
takes the stand that if an instrument is on its face apparently complete-this
is a question of law to be determined by the court-the parties obviously
intended the writing as a complete expression of their agreement; (2) Wig-
more,109 on the other hand, says in effect that whether an agreement appears
on its face to be complete is immaterial; that the court must examine the
surrounding circumstances, take testimony pro and con on the question
105. Grim v. Ware, 105 So.2d 807 (Fla. App. 1958).
106. 105 So.2d 809 (Fla. App 1958).
107. 105 So.2d 895 (Fla. App, 1958).
108. 3 VILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 633 (rev. ed. 1936).
109. 9 WIG-MORE, EvIrc § 2431 (3d ed. 1940).
1960]
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whether the transaction was intended to be covered by the writing, deciding
this as a matter of law, but merely for the purpose of ruling ol the applica-
bility of the parol evidence rule. If the court decides the transaction. was
intended to be integrated, it does not decide the factual question that the
negotiations as to extraneous matters did not take place; it merely decides
that if they took place, they are "legally immaterial." But if the court
determines the parties did not intend the writing to cover the whole agree-
ment, it rules that the parol evidence rule does not apply, and then leaves
to the jury the question whether the negotiations did or did not take place.
Thus the apparent paradox of receiving proof of certain negotiations in ordcr
to determine whether to receive them is resolved. In the instant case, the
court followed the WVigmorc rule, quoting it at length" '
The trial court correctly took testimony to determine whether the parties
had intended their written agreement to be complete (though on its face
it may have appeared to be so), and then finding that they had not, properly
admitted parol testimony to prove the partnership was a limited one, extend-
ing only to picking, packing and resale of oranges, but not to initial pur-
chase of oranges from the grower.
Thc court also held again that only parties to a contract or their privies
may invoke the parol evidence rile. In this case the plaintiff who attempted
to invoke the rule, was not a party to the partnership agreement, but rather
was seeking to charge a party to it, and thus was not eligible to invoke it.
The parol evidence rule was involved also in Greenwald v. Food Fair
Stores Corporation; 27th Averne Market Inc.'II The suit for accounting and
damages was predicated on fraud of the 27th Avenue Market in tricking
the plaintiff into entering into a lease. The lease granted store privileges
for a certain business, and reserved to the landlord the right to rent coin-
peting stores to third parties or to compete itself. The plaintiff sought to
introduce evidence to show that prior to making the lease the landlord's
agent had represented that Food Fair Stores had no interest in the building
and would not compete. The evidence was rejected and defendant had .
summary judgment.
A district court affirmed (1) holding rejection of the parol evidence
was proper, because the writing was integrated, the matter of competition
having been dealt with in the lease.112 On the charge of fraud the court
found the representation to be immaterial and so, not actionable.
'[he defendant Food Fair was not a party to the lease, and so had made
no promise :' to refrain from competing, and so was not liable. That the
110. The opinion cited \Vigmore verbatim, hut in transcription of the last sentence
of the quoted portion, several lines were omitted and the sense of the passage is severely
distorted.
111. 100 So.2d 200 (Fla. App. 1958).
112. Citing 9 \VIC3IoRE, EVnEc § 2430 (3d ed. 1940).
113. The commentator's assumption.
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officers in the two corporations were overlapping was not discussed by the
court, probably because the parol evidence rule would also apply to any
representation or promise made in behalf of Food Fair.
An ambiguity in a written instrument may of course be explained by
parol evidence, the parol evidence rule having no application to that situa-
tion. In J. M. Montgomery Roofing Co., Inc. v. Fred Howland, Inc.," 4
the court held that though the contract between the plaintiff subcontractor
and the defendant general contractor was unambiguous on its face, the
existence of another contract between the general contractor and a different
subcontractor served to cast some doubt on the meaning of the plaintiff's
contract "to render ambiguous a contract that otherwise would not have
been so;" and that in these circumstances parol evidence should have been
admitted to show the true intention of the parties. '"
The plaintiff's subcontract required him to furnish labor and materials
for "all ventilation" in accord with plans and specifications in the general
contract for a ventilating system which included hoods and ducts. The
defendant general contractor let a sub-contract for hoods and ducts to
another sub-contractor, and in this action by the plaintiff to recover a balance
due on his contract, claimed a credit for this work under a provision in the
plaintiff's contract allowing credit for work called for by the plaintiff's
contract and not done by it.
The very existence of the other contract for hoods and ducts, of the
same dignity and executed by the same official of the defendant general
contractor almost simultaneously with the contract with the plaintiff indi-
cated ambiguity, the court said, in reversing a summary judgment for the
general contractor and remanding the cause for further proceedings to resolve
the ambiguity.
TIIE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Where, despite other inducements, marriage is in whole or in part the
real consideration for an agreement, an oral promise to marry is within the
statute of frauds: the statute is no defense if the marriage is not the real end
or purpose of the agreement but was a mere incident or condition thereof.",,
In Greene v. Miller,117 a case of first impression in Florida, the court found
within the statute a woman's promise that if a man would continue to
render services to her in operation and management of a hotel she would
marry him and share with him the net income from the hotel. The promise
114. 98 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1957).
115. This would seem to be a question of whether the contract was integrated,
i.e., a question of intention, and therefore of fact, determinable by the NVigmore rule
in the Bessemer case, notes 107 and 109 supra. Williston's rule in this case would put a
bludgeon in this general contractor's hand.
116. Mutual promises only to marry arc, of course, not within the statute.
117. 104 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1958).
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of marriage was an essential element and could not be removed and leave
remaining a contract expression of the parties' intentions. The contract
was not divisible, the court said. It rejected the minority view that if a
promise be made upon a lawful and sufficient consideration, not within the
statute, the promisor cannot evade liability because there was another
consideration, proof of which is excluded by the statute. Nor was the contract
taken out of the statute because of the fact that no marriage took place,
as contended by the complaining party, his theory being that actual marriage
is itself a necessary part of every agrcement made in consideration of it. The
latter assumption the court rejected, noting that the statute applies to
bilateral as well as unilateral contracts, marriage itself generally being held
not sufficient part performance to take the contract out of the statute.
The court distinguished the cases involving promises to transfer land in
consideration of marriage where the injured party took possession or made
improvements, stating that these involved equitable doctrines peculiar to
land transactions. It held however, that though the remedy on the express
contract was barred, he should have been permitted to plead in quantunl
meruit to recover the reasonable value of his services.
In Bruce Construction Corp. v. State Exchange Bank,'" the question
was whether the promise of a Miami general contractor to a Lake City bank
to repay moneys advanced for a payroll to a subcontractor working on a
Lake City project of the general contractor, was a promise to pay the debt
of another.119. The trial court had directed a verdict for the plaintiff. The
evidence on the point showed that an official of the general contractor had
"promised" bank officials that if the bank would advance money for payrolls
to the subcontractor on checks drawn on the subcontractor's Miami Beach
bank his "firm would take care of the checks when they were presented in
Miami," and assured them he would "guarantee payment" on it. When two
checks were returned, the plaintiff bank first charged the subcontractor's
account 20 The district court reversed, holding that from these facts con-
flicting inferences might be drawn, that there was some evidence from which
the jury might infer the general contractor's promise to pay his own debt
which would be outside the statute.
PERFORMANCE
A university which reserves the right to have a student withdraw at any
time after his acceptance may do so without the necessity of furnishing the
student with a reason or cause; though the university must act in good faith
118. 102 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1958).
119. Statute of Frauds. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1957).
120. Students will be reminded of Lawrence v. Anderson, 108 Vt. 176, 184 Atd. 689
(1936) included in PATTERSON & GoIULE, CASES ON CONTRACTS 460 (4th ed. 1957).
Also consider the "main purpose" doctrine for which see 2 CORRIN, CONTRACTS § 369,
n. 25 (Supp. 1959) citing Bensam Corp. v. Felton, 63 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1953).
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and without malice. In a student's suit for specific performance of an enroll-
ment contract,' 2' the reserved right- having been set out in the university's
bulletin, the court found that the dismissal had not been arbitrary. The uni-
versity had acted to dismiss the student only after receiving information
prompting an investigation; had granted a hearing before a committee set up
to deal with questions of admissions in the school of education in which lie
was entered, and had acted upon the advice of the committee.
Although it upheld the right of the school to dismiss without cause, the
court found cause in that the student, a candidate for a certificate in second-
ary education, had been found by the committee to be fanatic in his views
on atheism, and concluded that he would seek to impose them on pupils
he might teach. He was thus ineligible to teach as an intern in the prescribed
student teaching program. The court also noted that a university should
consider itself under a duty not to graduate with its stamp of academic
approval persons having "attitudes of fanatical ideas, such as with reference
to atheism, which if imposed on the impressionable minds of the young . ..
would be calculated to operate to their detriment and injury." The court
held that there was no abuse of discretion in denying specific performance.
In Enid Corporation v. Mills,1'2 a contractor's suit to enforce a lien for
an amount alleged to be due for the construction of streets in a subdivision
owned by the defendants, a district court held that the risk of soil subsidence
was not to be bome by the contractor. The contract provided that the roads
were to be built to a grade set by stakes placed by the defendant's engineer.
The evidence showed that the engineer set the stakes for a five foot elevation,
and that the contractor built the roads accordingly, but repeatedly warned
the defendant that they might settle and offered to build them higher. The
defendant refused to permit this because a higher road would have required
*additional fill for lots adjacent to the road. Both defendant and plaintiff
were aware of the character of the subsoil at the time the contract was
entered into and later, -when the condition was encountered; each was aware
of the possibility of settlement. In view of the defendant's control of the
elevation, the decision seems correct.
The court also held that this was not an act of God which would
excuse the contractor. Florida courts might well abandon the misleading
phrase "act of God" in the rule "An unexpected impediment to the per-
formance of a contract will not relieve a party from his contractual
obligations, unless his performance is rendered impossible by an act of
God." 1 .3 Since the court well knows that even an act of God will not
excuse a contractor who promises to build a building (as opposed to merely
repairing one), his assumption of risk depends on other factors than divine
121. Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So.2d 442 (Fla. App. 1958).
122. 101 So.2d 903 (Fla. App. 1958).
123. See 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1324 (1951).
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whim.' 4 This court could also eschew the words "meeting of the minds",
which seem to connote a kind of subjective harmony the court itself would
not regard as requisite to formation of a contract. 125 If habit must persist,
inscrtion of the word "apparent" would make "neeting of the minds" more
accurate.
Restitution of a down payment pursuant to a land contract was sought
by a purchaser's representative apparently on the ground of impossibility of
performance by reason of insanity in Baroudi v. Hales. 12 Relief was denied.
The court did not speak of "impossibility," but in the opinion recounted
facts to show that perfomiance was not impossible.
The purchaser had entered into the contract during a lucid interval,
between judgments of incompetency following sanity restoration by court
decree. The contract provided that time was of the essence and for
retention of the down paymcnt as liquidated damages.
Although the proof showed that the incompetent himself could not
have closed the deal at the appointed time, his curator (appointed a month
before the time for closing) knew of the contract, and further, eight
months later offered to close.'
2 7
Citing the Florida rule that a defaulting purchaser may have restitution
where the reason for non-performance is "some misfortune occurring to the
purchaser," and there is a resulting benefit to the seller resulting in unjust
enrichmcnt " "2 the court found the rule inapplicable because the reason for
non-performance was not the purchaser's incompetence.
The Florida rule might better be stated in terms of supervening
impossibility of performance, a recognized excuse in contract law for not
performing."'2 "Some miisfortune occurring to the purchaser" - undoubtedly
a bequest from some pioneer court, in trust to successors-is virtually
meaningless. It probably is meant to signify that eveii a defaulter may have
restitution (to the extent of the defendant's unjust enrichment) if his
breach was not wilful.1
29
Specific perfornance of a land contract was denied, but restitution
of the deposit was decreed in a suit by a defaulting purchaser in Greenfield
v. Bland.13 Although the contract made time of the essence, the plaintiff
124. Ibid.
125. See Gendzier v. Bielecki, suPra note 81a.
126. 98 So.2d 515 (Fla. App. 1957).
127. Impossibility of performance, if it had existed, might have excused the condition
of the time ten, though not necessarily the duty to purchase.
127a. Goldfarh v, Robertson, 85 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1955); Beatty v. Flanner,, 49 So.2d
S1 (Fla. 1950).
128. Presumably the Florida rule applies to a performance which can he performed
only by the promisor. See 6 CORBIN, CoNrAcTs § 1334 (1951). This was not such a case.
129. Of course no breach willful or otherwise is involved if performance is excused by
impossibility. The Florida rule, however, is undoubtedly broad enough to include
situations other than impossibility.
130. 99 So.2d 727 (Fla. App. 1958).
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did not pay at the agreed time nor at the time extended by the seller. A
year elapsed before the purchaser demanded performance. Meanwhile, the
defendant, knowing the plaintiff had contracted to purchase for speculation
and that the event upon which increased value was expected had not come
to pass, believed the plaintiff did not intend to honor the contract and
placed valuable improvements on the land.
Noting that specific performance lies within the discretion of the
chancellor, whose decree will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly
erroneous, the district court agreed that there was evidence that the
plaintiff had been dilatory, and that the time term (a condition) had not
been waived or excused, and affirmed the decree denying specific performance.
The court's reason for allowing restitution is not stated, the court
decreeing it "in the light of the record." Since Florida courts seem to
follow the rule that a defaulting vendee cannot have restitution in the
absence of fraud or fortuitous "unfortunate inability to perform,"'' or some
other equity such as forfeiture, shocking to the court's conscience,'
32 it
must be assumed that the record indicated one of these circumstances, or
some special equity. In view of the fact that there are no definitive
conclusions concerning the right of a defaulting vendee to recover a down
payment (either with or without a provision for liquidated damages),.'
the district courts should state their reasons.
An attorney employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged
without cause before the occurrence of the condition on which the contract
was based was held by a district court'3 4 to he entitled to the reasonable
value of his services to the time of discharge, but subject to the happening
of the condition, with a charging lien to secure his right.
rhe client's cause for personal injuries had gone to trial, had resulted
in a mistrial following an offer of settlement which the client had rejected.
The attorney was then notified that his services were no longer required.
On the attorney's petition for authorization to withdraw and for fees,
the lower court entered judgment for the agreed 40%, based on the rejected
offer of settlement, and authorized a retaining lien on papers in the
attorney's possession pertaining to the cause.
In granting petition for certiorari, the appellate court held that the
attorney could be discharged with or without cause, that the lower court
erred in permitting recovery on the contract since the condition, recovery
by the client, had not happened.
131. See note 129 supra and accopnpanying text.
132. See Bom.R, FLORIDA REAL Es'rA'rE TRANSACTIONS § 4.07 (1960).
133. Ibid.
134. Osius v, Ilastings, 97 So,2d 623 (Fla. App. 1957).
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Holding that he was nevertheless entitled to the reasonable value of
his services,135 the court directed the lower court to enter an order establish-
ing a charging lien upon any settlement or judgment in the client's favor.
The retaining lien was discharged on the ground that it would hinder further
prosecution of the client's action and the happening of the condition upon
which the attorney's quantum meruit claim still depended.
That an attorney may recover iii quantum reruit, but limited to the
happening of the condition in the contract seems anomalous. While it is
true that the client may discharge an attorney, with or without cause,
(because the nature of the relationship requires complete confidence), it
does not follow that the client's action is not a breach. The Florida Supreme
Court in Goodkind v. Wolkowsky,135 declared that discharge without cause
is a breach. Discharge then, is an exercise of a power, not a right; there
is no implied in law condition permitting discharge, as a few courts hold.
In the Goodkind case, the plaintiff had substantially performed and
recovered on the contract, but the court in extensively reviewing many
authorities, observed that though the plaintiff had the alternative remedy
of recovery in quantum meruit, he was not confined to it, as the lower
court had held.
If the client's action was wrongful, the holding that the attorney's right
still depended on the happening of the condition in the contract is question-
able, and not merely anomalous. Admittedly there is conflict in authority
upon the question whether the amount of a quantum reruit recovery by
an attorney wrongfully discharged should be limited by the provisions
of the contract.'88
Restitution and illegality were unlikely companions in Wilson v.
Rooney.137 Like the little tailor who slew three with one blow,'3 8 a district
court in one decision smote a blow for three cherished, though unofficial,
tenets of Florida public policy: (1) judicial protection of Florida's land
economy, (2) judicial aversion to sin - in women, and perhaps (3) Florida's
superiority over California, metaphorically speaking.
In this case, a Florida man wooed and won a thrice-divorced California
woman before her fourth divorce became final. As man and wife they
removed to Florida where he established their home. He bought a house
(in his name) and paid living expenses; she contributed the furniture,
for which he ultimately paid her $25,000 13' After a year or two, for reasons
135. In practically all jurisdictions such recovery is allowed. 5 Aml. JUR. Attorneys at
Law § 182 (1936); but see § 172, n. 3, citing a few cases limiting recovery to the
occurrence of the condition.
135a. 132 Fla. 63, 180 So. 538 (1938).
136. For complete discussion see WooD, FEE CoNTRACTS Or LAXwYE5s 203 (Prentice-
Hall, New York, 1936).
137. 101 So.2d 892 ( Ra. App. 1958).
138. Flies, not giants. Perhaps Grimm's Fairy Tales.
139. What she did with the money does not appear, nor is it material except perhaps
tangentially, as a factor in the court's stated effort to "do complete justice regardless
of whether the litigants originally come into court with clean hands."
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not disclosed, the relationship was broken off; he moved out and ordered
her out.
She brought this suit in equity alleging his promise to give her the
house and pay her living expenses for the rest of her life, in exchange for
her promise to serve as his housekeeper. The court found, however, that the
consideration for his promise was the meretricious relationship and was
therefore illegal, and denied her relief.
But the keeper of the king's conscience took jurisdiction of the
Floridian's counterclaim and graciously awarded him $3,500 for her use
and occupation" of the house. In truth, the court seems to have allowed
the man for her unjust enrichment only during the period she had over-
stayed her welcome, for ten months, finger counting reveals - the court did
not say. Nor did the court state whether it regarded her as a tenant at
sufferance or a trespasser or give any reason why he should be recompensed
so handsomely. In the end, the man still had his house; had her furniture;
had had two years' housekeeping service, admittedly non-recompensable:
still, he did have them; and in addition, a munificent rent. In view of the
fact that these people had been in pari delicto, to assume, as the court
evidently did, that the man could so easily, even precipitately, end the
illegal bargain141 and immediately start afresh, with property to rent, is
shocking. With this kind of encouragement, Florida landowners can detour
around the next boom-bust with both ease and profit. Our court has shown
the way.
A party wall agreement was held unenforceable in H. B. Holding
Company v. Girtnan142 because performance would be in violation of
law. The contract provided that either party could build a new party wall
in case of partial or total destruction. A city ordinance prohibited repair
costing more than 20% of the building's value without compliance with
the building code for new buildings. Since the repairs proposed by the
plaintiff could not be accomplished without violation of the ordinance,
he was not entitled to enter the defendant's land to make them.
The usury laws of Florida cannot be defeated by use of a corporate
shell to cloak a loan which is actually being made to an individual bor-
rower.' 43 Statutes make usurious interest provisions exceeding 10% on loans
to individuals, but 15% on loans to corporations.
44
Whether a loan to a corporation is actually a loan to an individual,
and merely a device to avoid usury laws is a question of fact to be determined
in each case. The evidence in Gilbert v. Doris R. Corporation44a showed
140. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.05, 83.20 (1957) make provision for the common law action
for use and occupation.
141. See 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1536 (1951); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §, 1 4 0 ,
and comment (1937).
142. 96 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1957).
'143. Gilbert v. Doris R. Corp., IIl So.2d 682 (Fla. App. 1959).
144. FtA. STAT. §§ 687.02, 687.03 (1957).
144a. See note 143 s4pra.
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that the lender refused to lend unless the borrower would form a corporation
for the sole purpose of borrowirg in order that lie might exact the higher
rate of interest. The borrower, therefore, formed a corporation, transferred
his land to it, executed its note and mortgage to the lender carrying the
corporate interest rate, in exchange (as the trial court found) for money
loaned for the use and benefit of an individual. So whatever may be the
right of a lender to exact incorporation as a condition of lending money,
he may not do so as a device to avoid usury laws. This particular device
is doubly opprobrious because it adds the cost of incorporation to the
higher interest. Under the statute the borrower was entitled to a credit
of double the amount of interest paid for willful violation.1 4.
In Parker v. B3ryce , 4 " the Supreme Court held that since any claim
of usury involves the question of intent and willfulness, it is a question
of fact and should be disposed of by a jury, and not by the court on motion
for a summary judgment. The court said that the question of intent is not
fully determined by the fact that the lender actually gets more than the
law permits; he must also have a purpose to do so. The judgment was
reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Usury was again in issue in Silverstein v. Wakefield"'7 as the basis for
the plaintiff's suit to declare a note and mortgage void. The court held,
however, that the evidence showed no usury though it did show that
unconscionable advantage was taken of the plaintiff. The loan was procured
through a mortgage broker and bore a legal rate of interest. The mortgage
broker was found not to be an agent of the lender, so the heavy fees
deducted by the broker as a commission for services from the proceeds
of the loan were not attributable to the lender, who thus had no intent to
charge more than the legal rate of interest. A dissenting judge differed
on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence with respect to the
broker's agency for the lender.
In Dillon v. Walter,148 a district court held that usury laws were not
applicable where there was no loan of money, advance of money, or
forbearance of a debt. Where no money passed, and the plaintiff's note
and mortgage were executed in exchange for work and materials in building
a house, it made no difference that the cash price offered by the construct-
ion company was different from and less than the credit price; the
difference was not a loan.
In Brown v. Dyrne,''9 champerty was alleged as a defense to the
plaintiff's action upon an express contract by the defendant to pay for his
145. PI.A. STAT. § 687.04 (1957) (the court held the case distinguishable from
Holland v. Gross, 89 So.2d 255, 63 A.L.R.2d 920 (Fla. 1956), with analysis and
discussion of the Holland case in annotation at page 955).
146. 96 So.2d 154 (Fla. App. 1957).
147. 112 So.2d 406 (Fla. App. 1959).
148. 98 So.2d 391 (Via. App. 1957).
149. 109 So.2d 788 (FIa. App. 1959).
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services in aiding the defendant in bringing suit for an accounting against
her real estate agent. The district court held that there was evidence of
champerty sufficient to go to the jury and from which a jury might infer
champerty in the following: the plaintiff and defendant met at a social
gathering; the defendant, a widow and inexperienced in business, was
encouraged by the plaintiff to suspect her real estate agent of improper
profit-making activities against her interest. At his instance she later sued
her agent for an accounting. The litigation thus provoked resulted in a
finding that the agent had faithfully discharged his trust. Champerty was
not, in this case, a question of law to be decided by the court.
A suit for rescission of a land contract for fraud failed in Sutton v.
Crane.'50 In his complaint the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's agent,
in presenting the contract for the plaintiff's signature, orally represented
to the plaintiff that the writing contained a provision giving the plaintiff
an option to contiguous lands, whereas it did not; that he did not read
the writing because of diseased eyes and extremely poor vision. In affirming
the lower court's decision, the district court held that one of the necessary
elements for relief from fraud is the right to rely upon the truth of the
representation. One who cannot read a contract is grossly negligent in
not having some third party read it to him, and thus has no right to rely.
The plaintiff's right to rely was further diminished by his having entered
into an amended contract with the defendant after he had knowledge of the
false representation.
A brokerage commission already paid by the seller to the broker was
sought to be recovered in an action by the seller against the purchaser in
Park Central Hotel Co. v. Park Corporation'5' on either of two theories:
(1) an alleged contract of indemnity, or (2) fraud.
As to the first cause, the court dismissed, holding that no contract
(offer?) to indemnify could be implied from the purchaser's mere statement
to the seller that he had not been introduced by any broker to the negotia-
tions resulting in the contract of purchase. '
As to the second cause, fraud, the court held the seller estopped to
claim that he was misled by the purchaser to believe no broker was
involved by a judgment in a prior action by the broker against both seller
and purchaser. In that action the broker had judgment in two parts,
recovering (I ) against the seller upon its contract with the broker, and
(2) against the buyer upon a conspiracy with the seller to defraud the
broker of his commission.
150. 101 So.2d 823 (Fla. App. 1958). Note that it is the appearance of assent, not
actual assent which justifies the offeror in assuming the offeree has accepted (in the
absence of fraud). This is the objective theory of contracts. See 1 \VII.IsToN, CoN'RACTS
§ 35 (3d ed. 1957).
151. 97 So.2d 28 (Fla. App. 1957).
151a. On the "offer" point, the court held that no reasonable person in the posi-
tion of this seller could reasonably believe the purchaser was promising that no broker
was involved.
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Duress which will avoid a contract must be duress which exists when
the contract was made, the court held in Stone v. Austin.'1 " It is immaterial
that there may have been prior influence or pressure. Thus where the
evidence showed that although for a time a husband attempted to induce
a wife to sign a contract for the sale of their homestead by threatening
to divorce her if she did not sign, but that ultimately she did sign freely,
without apparent hesitation or unhappiness, there was no duress.
A right of rescission not adhered to will be regarded as a waiver of
the right, the court held in Rood Company, Inc. v. Board of Public
Instruction of Dade County' 3 in the company's suit for rescission for
mistake.
The defendant Board had contracted to purchase from the plaintiff
company certain land in a larger tract which the company proposed to
subdivide, and promised the Board that it would cause the plat of the
subdivision to be recorded. In carrying out this promise, however, the
company was required by Dade County, as a prerequisite to recording the
plat, to enter into an agreement with the county to fill the subdivision
(including the lot the plaintiff had contracted to sell to the Board) to an
elevation of seven feet. The plaintiff did make such an agreement, recorded
the plat and nine months later conveyed the land to the Board.
Because the plaintiff did not act promptly to rescind and continued
to recognize the contract by conveying and accepting the money for the
conveyance, an intention to waive any right of rescission was readily found.
That the parties may not have intended that the plaintiff fill the land
when they entered into their contract; that there may have been a mutual
or unilateral mistake on this point, was immaterial then. '[lie court
characterized this as "waiver by election.'' ". . . [W]hcre one has an
election to ratify or disaffirm a conveyance, he can either claim under or
against it, but be cannot do both.
A conditional seller who sells to a dealer, delivering the chattel with
indicia of authority to sell is estopped to claim the right to possession
of the chattel against a bona fide purchaser for value without actual notice
of the conditional seller's interest, notwithstanding the fact that the
conditional seller recorded its contract.' The effect of recording presented
a novel question in Florida, the court said, prior cases not having involved
that fact. This appeared to the court to be the general rule, which is
generally bottomed on estoppel, however dissimilar the reasoning in the
several states.
152. 107 So.2d 232 (Fla. App. 1958).
153. 102 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1958).
154. For the numerous meanings of waiver, see 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 679
(rev. ed. 1936).




In Ayala v. Murrell,a' a suit to enjoin a breach of contract, the question
was whether an assignee had assumed' 57 the duties of the assignor (a filling
station owner and operator) under the assignor's contract with a distributor
of petroleum products to purchase from it all his requirements for the
station for 15 years; "all covenants to run with the land and constitute
an obligation on the premises."' l8 The assignment to the defendant
contained no express assumption of the duties under the contract, i.e., to
take and pay for plaintiff's products. However, for approximately two
years the assignee did so, up to the time it sought another distributor and
began removing plaintiff's tanks. From the fact that the defendant had
perforned, the court found his implied promise to assume all the duties
under the contract, in that he thus led the plaintiff reasonably to believe
that "he had made the contract his own," his acts being explicable only
on that theory.' 59 The bill for an injunction should not have been dismissed.
An obligor with notice of an assignment cannot safely pay the assignor
even if the assignor retains a note evidencing the assigned debt, it was
held in Kaufman v. Bernstein.""' The owner of land took a note and purchase
money mortgage which lie bequeathed to his son. The son made a partial
assignment of the mortgage to his sister, whose interest the obligor (maker
of the note and mortgage) recognized by making a substantial payment
to her. Later the obligor and assignor entered into a compromise agreement
under which the assignor gave the obligor a discharge of the entire mortgage.
In this suit by the partial assignee to foreclose, the court held that although
the assignor retained the note, the obligor knew of the assignee's interest
and therefore could not obtain a discharge of the debt without her consent.
A lessee who had assigned the lease with the consent of the lessor
was denied the right to recover a security deposit which under the lease
was to run concurrently with the rent payments for the last six months
of the term."" In the assignment the assignor-lessee transferred the privilege
of availing itself of the previously paid security deposit, but reserved
the right to the security deposit to itself, the assignee promising to pay
the last six months rent to the assignor. Notice of assignment, but not
of the reservation, was given to the lessor who later (but before the final
156. 97 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1957).
157. Students sometimes need to be reminded that this is merely a question of
offer and acceptance in a special setting.
1i58. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the contract constituted
a covenant running with the land or an equitable servitude.
159. T[ough the assignee did not expressly promise his assignor to perform,
undoubtedly the assignor did delegate his duty to perform, giving the assignee power
to perform. The assignee's conduct might be referable to his power only. But under
the circumstances of this case, the court's conclusion as to the assignee's apparent intent
to promise seems more reasonable.
160. 100 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1958).
161. H1ayes v. Cameron, 101 So.2d 45 (IFla. App. 1958).
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six months) accepted a surrender of the lease from the assignee, and in
so doing, assigned all his rights iii the lease. '[he reservation in the contract
between assignor and assignee could not affect the lessor because he
was not a party to it, the court held. Even if one should disagree with
the court's conclusion that the assignor intended to assign all his rights
(in the face of his reservation), the obligor who was without notice of it
could reasonably assume all rights were assigned to the assignee, who so
far as the obligor knew, could give him a valid discharge. 02
[IHRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS
That restrictive covenants may be enforced by any grantee in a sub-
division on a third party beneficiary contract theory, rather than as a
senitude or easement, was again indicated in Batman v. Creighlton.l ' 3 Who
is liable to whom, of course, is dependent on the manifested intent of the
parties. '11e owner who subdivides his land according to a plan for
uniform development with restrictions as to its use, promises each grantee
that the land will not be used otherwise, for the benefit of a class, any
member of which may enforce the covenant against him. Moreover, each
grantee who takes his land with reference to such a recorded plat thus
becomes a promisor to his own grantor and liable for breach to any
member of the class for whose benefit the contract was made, i.e., any other
owner in the subdivi'ion.'6 4 \Vhether one's own deed contains such a
restriction, then, is immaterial, whether one be plaintiff or defendant in
any action to enforce the restriction.
Yet another contract involved the question whether the plaintiff was
a third party beneficiary who could suc on a contract made between an
employer and a local plumber's unionr ' \ Whether one can suc, or whether
he is a mere incidental beneficiary who cannot sue, is a question of the
apparent intent of the parties "that one of the parties should become the
debtor of the third.'''
"
In this instance, the plaintiff was a non-profit corporation, known as
the Phlbing Industry Program, having as its main purpose the advance-
162. Vhat rights were transferred and conversely retained is, of course, merely a
matter of interpretation: What did the offeror apparently intend to transfer? As between
the assignor and assignee, the assignor's intent to retain this right was manifest. But
as against the obligor without notice, the usual role should apply. Sec RESTArrmwNr,
CoNTRACIS § 170(2)(b) (1932).
163. 101 So.2d 587 (Ila. App. 1958).
164. The court states that this precise point is new in Florida, but does not label
such a grantee a "promisor" though its meaning is evident.
165. NcCann Plumbing Co. v. Plumbing Industry Program, Inc., 105 So.2d 26
(Fla. App. 1958).
166. Citing Wright v. Terry, 23 Fla, 160, 2 So. 6 (1887). Corbin criticizes this
rule for determining intent to benefit (as have many other legal writers), and quotes
from a case: "Payment direct to the third person is, of course a benefit to him, and,
if that is required by a contract, the intent to so benefit is beyond question." 4 CoRBIN,
CONT-RACIs § 777 Vl9SI). In short, if performance is to go dlirectly to the third party,
the intent is clear. It is only in the cases where the contract does not call for this that
there is a problem.
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ment of the plumbing industry through Cducation and institutional
advertising. The contract first stated the union's understanding that the
employers were carrying out such a program for the benefit of the industry;
that certain employers had consented to contribute to the Program, and
that the union required that the employer contribute to the Program a
minimum of 10 per hour paid for each employee. A clause then provided
that the employer "agrecs to contribute to the Plumbing Industry Program"
the amount specified.
Applying its own test to determine the parties' intent, the court found
that although they intended this provision for their own mutual benefit
in that it would advance the industry as a whole, they also intended to
benefit the plaintiff corporation to which the defendant employer had
agreed to make payments. The court also held that it was proper, in a
suit for accounting to determine finally the question of the third party's
right. to accounting prior to the actual accounting.
DAMAGES
The proof required to show that damage to a residence was caused
by subterranean termites, after a contract to insulate it was in force, was
in question in Termitrol Engineers, Inc. v. Duncan.'6 7 (The defendant
exterminator had agreed to insulate against subterranean termites in 1955,
make additional chemical applications up to May 1957, and to replace
and repair any damage caused by such termites accruing after the contract
was in force.) The lower court was held to have becn correct in its refusal
to direct a verdict for the defendant, it being unnecessary for the plaintiff
owner to show definitely that the damage did not occur before the contract
was signed, or that the damage was done by subterranean and not "dry"
termites, strict proof as to either matter being virtually impossible.
'[here was, however, testimony by an expert biologist that the damage
was caused by subterranean termites, though dry termites may have been
present also, and that in his opinion it was caused within a year before
his inspection in February 1957, and if it had been properly treated in
1955 and 1956, the damage would not have occurred. There was also
testimony by a contractor and the president of the defendant company
that live termites were present a year to two years following initial
treatment. This evidence was held to be sufficient to support a jury verdict
for the plaintiff.
At least two brokers' cases involved a question of damages. One was an
action for a commission" 8 in which the broker had a jury verdict to which
the trial court had added interest for almost three years prior to the
167. 112 So.2d 419 (Fla. App. 1959),
168. Bailey v. Swartz, 97 So,2d 310 (Fla. App. 1957).
1960]
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judgment, the jury having made no finding as to interest nor included it in
the verdict. In reversing, the district court held inapplicable the rule in
Tucker v. Hughey,l "a in which a federal trial court had noted the Florida
rule that a trial court is without authority to add interest to the verdict
of a jury, but had held that in the case before it certain features in
handling altered the rule. The district court reaffirmed the Florida rule.
The other case concerned the measure of a stockbroker's recovery
in the event a customer breaches his contract to take and pay for stock100
The court noted that in such an cvcnt a broker may elect to treat the
stock as property of the customer, tender it and sue for the full purchase
price; or in the alternative, sell the stock promptly or within a reasonable
time thereafter, and recover the difference between the purchase price and
the amount received on sale. The latter remedy is available if he chooses
to retain the stock as his own, with the latter measure of damage. The
trial court then, erred in charging the jury that the measure of damage
was the purchase price of the stock less its value at the time of the trial,
and erred in excluding evidence of the value of the stock at the time of the
customer's refusal to take it. No Florida cases were cited, but the court
followed the general rule which denies the broker the right to choose
the time of breach and thus the amount of his recovery.
Tin STATrUrE or LuinTAt'iONS
The statute of limitations applicable to actions for malpractice against
a physician is now governed 70 by the same rule applied to other situations
in which a party has an election to sue in contract or in tort, viz: if
the action sounds in contract, the general three year statute of limitations"I
governing contract actions applies; if in tort, the four year statute 72 applies.
In an earlier malpractice action, Palmer v. Jackson,'" the supreme court
had seemed to hold that although the action sounded in tort, the statute
governing contract actions applied. To the extent that this was so, the
supreme court here held Palmer overruled, adding that the action in tort
is not converted to one upon the contract merely because the contract is
disclosed as a matter of inducetnent.
168a. 6 F.R.D. 545 (S.D. Fla. 1917).
169. Mass v. Gordon, 101 So.2d 836 (FI. App. 1958).
170. Manning v. Serrano, 97 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1957).
171. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(5)(e) (1957).
172. Id. § 95.11(1).
173. 62 Fla. 249, 57 So. 240 (1911), followed in Slaughter v. Tyler, 126 Fla. 515,
171 So. 320 (1936). The court noted that the Palmer rule was then supported in only
one jurisdiction (Ky.), since then abandoned by virtue of a statutory amendment. (Many
states, unlike Florida, have statutes expressly covering malpractice actions, and so are
unconcerned with the problem).
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